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THE YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM
OCTOBER 26, 2016

Keeping the Promise of Public Fiduciary Theory:
A Reply to Leib and Galoob
Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent
introduction
For centuries, prominent jurists and political theorists have looked to private ﬁduciary relationships such as trusteeship, agency, and guardianship to
explain and justify the authority of public officials and public institutions.1
This tradition has attracted increasing interest over the past decade, as legal
1.
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See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1879) (“[T]he power of governing is a trust
committed by the people to the government, no part of which can be granted away. The
people, in their sovereign capacity, have established their agencies for the preservation of the
public health and the public morals, and the protection of public and private rights.”); Trist
v. Child, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 441, 450 (1874) (“The theory of our government is, that all public stations are trusts, and that those clothed with them are to be animated in the discharge
of their duties solely by considerations of right, justice, and the public good.”); CICERO,
Moral Goodness, in DE OFFICIIS I.XXV 85, 87 (Walter Miller trans., 1928) (“For the administration of the government, like the office of a trustee, must be conducted for the beneﬁt of
those entrusted to one’s care, not of those to whom it is entrusted.”); HUGO GROTIUS, DE
MARE LIBERUM ch. V, 29 (Ralph Deman Magoffin trans., 1916) (“[O]ne of the ﬁrst gifts of
Justice is the use of common property for common beneﬁt.”); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN
227 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) (“The only way to erect such a Common
Power . . . is to confer all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of
men, to beare their person . . . .”); JOHN LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent
and End of Civil Government (1690), in SOCIAL CONTRACT 4 (Sir Ernest Barker ed., Oxford
University Press 1948) (arguing that “the power of a magistrate over a subject may be distinguished from that of a father over his children, a master over his servant, a husband over
his wife, and a lord over his slave”); THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 243 (James Madison) (“The
federal and state governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, instituted with different powers, and designated for different purposes.”).
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scholars have used ﬁduciary concepts to elucidate important features of public
law, from the nature and design of constitutional government,2 to the legal obligations that attend public offices such as judge and legislator.3 We have contributed to this revival of public ﬁduciary theory by showing that ﬁduciary
principles can explain and justify the structure and content of administrative
law4 and international law.5 The great promise of public ﬁduciary theory, we
have argued, lies in its powerful “criterion of legitimacy,” which links the legal
authority of public officers and institutions to the principle that “state action
must always be interpretable as action taken in the name of or on behalf of every agent subject to the state’s power.”6
In an essay published recently in the Yale Law Journal, Professors Ethan
Leib and Stephen Galoob argue that public ﬁduciary theory applies to some
domains of public law but not others because these other domains “are incompatible with the basic structure of ﬁduciary norms.”7 In defending this claim,
Leib and Galoob draw on and develop a revisionist theory of ﬁduciary law that
is grounded in ethical and deliberative norms traditionally associated with

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.
7.

See, e.g., Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502 (2006)
(arguing that “the origins of judicial review lie in corporate law”); Gary Lawson, Gary I.
Seidman & Robert G. Natelson, The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal Protection, 94 B.U.
L. REV. 415 (2014) (describing the Constitution as a ﬁduciary document in which equal protection is inherent).
See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider Trading and the
Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845 (2013) (arguing that judges are
ﬁduciaries under federal insider trading laws); Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699 (2013) (providing historical arguments for treating judges as ﬁduciaries); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126
HARV. L. REV. 671 (2013) (arguing that political representatives are ﬁduciaries “subject to a
duty of loyalty”).
See EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY 151-233 (2011);;
Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 441 (2010) [hereinafter Criddle, Fiduciary Administration]; Evan J.
Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006); Evan J.
Criddle, Mending Holes in the Rule of (Administrative) Law, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1271 (2010);
Evan Fox-Decent, Democratizing Common Law Constitutionalism, 55 MCGILL L.J. 511 (2010).
See EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY: HOW INTERNATIONAL
LAW CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY (2016) [hereinafter CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF
HUMANITY]; Evan J. Criddle, Standing for Human Rights Abroad, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 269
(2015); Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L
L. 331 (2009); Evan Fox-Decent & Evan J. Criddle, The Fiduciary Constitution of Human
Rights, 15 LEGAL THEORY 301 (2009).
CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY, supra note 5, at 3, 99.
Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE L.J. 1820,
1821 (2016) [hereinafter Leib & Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory].
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affective relationships such as friendship.8 Based on this theory, they contend
that public ﬁduciary theory applies only to relationships in which one party
(the ﬁduciary) bears robust deliberative obligations, including a freestanding
motivational requirement to attribute “nonderivative signiﬁcance” to the interests of another party (the beneﬁciary).9 The deliberative obligation is “freestanding” in the sense that “[s]peciﬁc patterns of deliberation can violate ﬁduciary norms regardless of how (or whether) they are connected with
behavior.”10 Leib and Galoob believe that these alleged deliberative characteristics of ﬁduciary relationships cast doubt on our thesis that administrative law
reﬂects public ﬁduciary theory,11 and they categorically rule out our arguments
8.

See Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Intentions, Compliance, and Fiduciary Duty, 20 LEGAL
THEORY 106 (2014) [hereinafter Galoob & Leib, Intentions] (developing their “shaping” account of ﬁduciary loyalty in which a loyal ﬁduciary must deliberate as follows: “in deliberating, a loyal ﬁduciary robustly attributes nonderivative signiﬁcance to her beneﬁciary’s interests,” id. at 115); Leib & Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory, supra note 7, at 1839 (drawing on
Ethan Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665 (2009)).
9. Id. at 1829; see also id. at 1836-38 (discussing considerations that “might move a ﬁduciary to
behave or deliberate in the way that ﬁduciary norms call for” but that “[d]espite their motivational efficacy, these are nonetheless the wrong kinds of reasons”); id. at 1849-52 (arguing
that prophylactic rules against judicial conﬂicts of interest and ex parte contacts reﬂect ﬁduciary norms’ purported concern with ensuring untainted ﬁduciary motivations); id. at 1873
(alleging that “any way of conforming to [human rights] norms, however motivated, counts
as compliance”); id. at 1874 (claiming that “a state whose behavior conforms to the requirements of human rights norms but whose motivations are inappropriate would nonetheless
breach [deliberative ﬁduciary] norms”).
10. Id. at 1834; see also id. at 1830, 1832 n.48, 1859, 1871-73, 1873 n.232 (affirming that ﬁduciary
norms impose deliberative obligations or requirements that are freestanding in the sense
that they are independent of behavior or outcomes).
11. See id. at 1854-68. Leib and Galoob tentatively endorse our argument that administrative law
is amenable to ﬁduciary theory, see id. at 1868, and they offer support for our view that the
ﬁduciary theory of administrative law is normatively superior to Adrian Vermeule’s publicchoice theory, see id. at 1865 (asserting that Vermeule’s theory is “inconsistent with core
democratic values”). Ultimately, however, they conclude that ﬁduciary theory’s viability as a
positive theory of administrative law “is an open question,” id. at 1825, because public-choice
theory “can explain many of the same results that the ﬁduciary model explains,” id. at 1868.
The problem with this critique is that it does not give sufficient weight to administrative
law’s internal point of view—in particular, the norms that courts use to explain and justify
their own practices. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89-91 (3d ed. 2012) (distinguishing positivist theories that are based on internal and external points of view). Although
Leib and Galoob observe that Vermeule’s public choice theory can explain some norms and
outcomes (the external point of view), they emphasize repeatedly that Vermeule’s theory is
inconsistent with legal norms that judges routinely affirm and apply in administrative law
cases (the internal point of view). See, e.g., Leib & Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory, supra
note 7, at 1860 (noting the inconsistency between Vermeule’s claim that “‘hard look’ review
is illusory” and the ample “rhetorical evidence [in judicial opinions] to the contrary”); id. at
1862-64 (arguing that public-choice theory is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s scrutiny of administrative agencies’ deliberative processes). Because ﬁduciary theory is capable of
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for using public ﬁduciary theory to explain and justify existing international
law and its institutions.12
In this Reply, we explain why the Leib-Galoob critique of public ﬁduciary
theory misses the mark. Part I shows that their critique is based on a theory of
ﬁduciary relations that is in tension with well-established features of private
ﬁduciary law. Because their theory of ﬁduciary relations cannot explain core aspects of ﬁduciary law, it fails as a theory of ﬁduciary law. Part II defends our ﬁduciary theory of public international law against the Leib-Galoob critique.
Their critique applies their theory of ﬁduciary relations to international law,
but because that theory is unpersuasive as a theory of ﬁduciary law, it cannot
serve as a benchmark for assessing whether various ﬁelds of public law—
including public international law—are amenable to ﬁduciary theorizing. Having said that, and to give our critics the beneﬁt of the doubt, we consider
whether international law and its institutions are as insensitive to deliberation
as Leib and Galoob claim. There are signiﬁcant aspects of international legal
order—international adjudication and global administrative law—with national
analogues that Leib and Galoob endorse as fruitful sites for public ﬁduciary
theorizing. We similarly suggest that other features of international law, such
as its dominant model for review of human rights violations, are also highly
explaining administrative law’s formal requirements from both the internal and external
points of view, it offers a more robust positive theory than Vermeule’s public-choice alternative. The one place Leib and Galoob think ﬁduciary political theory applies without qualiﬁcation is the practice of judging, a topic on which one of them has previously written. See
Leib, Ponet & Serota, supra note 3. Unlike the case of administrative law, however, the existence of an alternative, outcome-centred view of judging (i.e., the theory of Judge Richard
Posner, which they discuss at length) curiously does not lead them to conclude that the “viability” of a ﬁduciary theory of judging is an “open question.” Leib & Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory, supra note 7, at 1825.
12. Leib & Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory, supra note 7, at 1825 (“Fiduciary norms are structurally incompatible with the domain of international law . . . .”); see also id. at 1876
(“[F]iduciary norms are structurally incompatible with the extant norms of international
law.”). See generally id. at 1868-77 (presenting several arguments for the discordance of ﬁduciary norms and international law). They are prepared to grant that “even if Fox-Decent and
Criddle’s ﬁduciary theory does not describe how extant international law actually operates,
the justiﬁcatory culture it envisions might be a worthy standard to which the international
legal order should aspire,” id. at 1877 n.242, and that “[i]t is possible to imagine a version of
international legal order that enshrines a robust ‘culture of justiﬁcation’ like the one Criddle
sees at the core of administrative law,” but they immediately add that “there are good reasons
why (given our existing institutions) international-law norms do not police deliberation or
impose standards for compliance or robustness,” id. at 1876. In short, although they
acknowledge that an international legal order consistent with a “culture of justiﬁcation” and
their view of ﬁduciary norms is conceptually possible, and that the “justiﬁcatory culture” envisioned by our view of international law might offer a normatively attractive aspirational
standard, they nonetheless conclude that the present international legal order is “structurally
incompatible” with ﬁduciary theorizing, given their view of the structure of ﬁduciary norms.
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deliberation-sensitive—sensitive, that is, to public justiﬁcation rather than to
the decision-maker’s personal motives for decision, which are irrelevant. Part
III challenges Leib and Galoob’s methodological approach to public ﬁduciary
theory, which draws on abstract moral philosophy to deduce ethical norms that
(they claim) operate as legal constraints on a ﬁduciary’s internal mental states
and processes.13 We explain why we—like most other public ﬁduciary theorists—have rejected this methodology in favor of an interpretivist approach
that takes extant legal norms, institutions, and practices seriously as the starting point for critical analysis.
i. identifying fiduciary norms
The Leib and Galoob essay is motivated by an important question: what is
the proper methodology for using ﬁduciary concepts to analyze aspects of public law? Leib and Galoob answer this question by arguing that ﬁduciary relationships are constituted by ﬁduciary norms, and that there are certain implicit
structural features of these norms that distinguish them from non-ﬁduciary
norms.14 Although Leib and Galoob do not offer a clear account of the relationships between “ﬁduciary norms” and ﬁduciary duties,15 they appear to understand ﬁduciary norms as imposing “standards of compliance” that inform how
courts deﬁne and apply the duties of loyalty and care.16
In particular, Leib and Galoob argue that legal norms do not qualify as “ﬁduciary” unless they impose on agents requirements of deliberativeness, conscientiousness, and robustness.17 A norm is “deliberative,” in the sense important to Leib and Galoob, if it places “demands on an agent’s deliberation in
addition to her behavior.”18 A norm entails “conscientiousness” if it requires an
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.
18.
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See id. at 1831-32.
See, e.g., id. at 1828 n.28.
Leib and Galoob claim that “ﬁduciary norms are constituted by ﬁduciary principles” and
that these principles “are usually, but not necessarily, stated in the form of requirements applicable to the ﬁduciary.” Id. at 1824 n.11. The most obvious candidates for such requirements would seem to be ﬁduciary duties. However, they also claim that “ﬁduciary duties are
established and entailed by ﬁduciary norms and principles.” Id. They further characterize ﬁduciary norms as ﬁduciary principles plus a “socio-empirical element” that denotes the acceptance of ﬁduciary principles “within the domains (generally those in private law) over
which ﬁduciary laws apply.” Id. As we shall see, however, Leib and Galoob’s proposed structural features of ﬁduciary norms fail to live up to their own socio-empirical criterion for
norms, since those features are not generally present (much less accepted) in ﬁduciary law in
the private law context.
Id. at 1836.
Id. at 1824.
Id.

keeping the promise of public fiduciary theory

agent to act “for the right reasons”19—speciﬁcally, based on a “commitment to
the fate of the purpose or person” over whom the agent exercises power.20 And
a ﬁduciary norm is “robust” if it “require[s] the ﬁduciary to seek out and respond appropriately to new information about the interests of her beneﬁciaries.”21 Fiduciary norms are said to be “unique in being simultaneously characterized by all three [structural features].”22 And perhaps more provocatively
still, Leib and Galoob claim that these structural features imply that all ﬁduciary norms impose “freestanding deliberative requirements”; i.e., requirements
that exist wholly independently of the ﬁduciary’s conduct or the outcome such
conduct might produce.23 According to Leib and Galoob, a public law regime
cannot properly be understood as “ﬁduciary” unless its structure plausibly reﬂects norms with the features they specify, and these norms operate as freestanding deliberative requirements.24 Leib and Galoob acknowledge that their
three alleged structural features “are only rarely made explicit in ﬁduciary law,”
but they assert nonetheless that these features “are implicit in ﬁduciary
norms.”25
Curiously, Leib and Galoob assert that “almost all” ﬁduciary theorists
should be able to accept their structural features of deliberation, conscientiousness, and robustness, regardless of their differing views on the substance of
particular ﬁduciary norms.26 This is a signiﬁcant overstatement. Many—
perhaps most—ﬁduciary theorists today do not accept the idea that the legal
norm of ﬁduciary loyalty “impose[s] freestanding deliberative requirements.”27
Consider, for example, the economic theory of ﬁduciary law, which currently
dominates American corporate law and trust law scholarship.28 Practitioners of

19.
20.

21.
22.
23.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at 1836 (quoting Paul B. Miller, Principles of Public Fiduciary Administration, in BOUNDARIES OF STATE, BOUNDARIES OF RIGHTS (Anat Scolnicov & Tsvi Kahana eds., forthcoming
2016) (manuscript at 23-24)).
Id. at 1824 (citing PHILIP PETTIT, THE ROBUST DEMANDS OF THE GOOD: ETHICS WITH ATTACHMENT, VIRTUE, AND RESPECT (2015)).
Id. at 1828.
Id. at 1832 & n.48; see, e.g., id. at 1830 (describing tort-law norms and default contractual
norms as deliberation-insensitive, while criminal norms and ﬁduciary norms are deliberation-sensitive).
Id. at 1828.
Id. at 1828 n.28.
Id. at 1827-28.
Id. at 1832 n.48.
See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to
Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 29 (1990); Brian R. Cheffins, Law, Economics and
Morality: Contracting Out of Corporate Law Fiduciary Duties, 19 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 28, 30-32
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law and economics have argued for decades that ﬁduciary duties are best understood as contractual default rules that protect beneﬁciaries from harmful
opportunism.29 In their view, ﬁduciary legal norms are formally indifferent to a
ﬁduciary’s internal mental processes; ﬁduciary law simply seeks to guarantee
outcomes in which beneﬁciaries do not suffer harm from a ﬁduciary’s selfdealing or proﬂigacy. Another inﬂuential theory, articulated most extensively
by Matthew Conaglen, asserts that ﬁduciary law is designed to remove distractions that could interfere with a ﬁduciary’s performance of her contractual or
other non-ﬁduciary duties.30 Like the economic theory, this account of ﬁduciary law conceives of ﬁduciary norms in instrumentalist terms as concerning
themselves exclusively with achieving ends, not with policing a ﬁduciary’s internal mental processes.31 Stephen Smith similarly argues that ﬁduciary law is
not concerned with loyalty or a ﬁduciary’s motives, but with the outcome of the
ﬁduciary’s actions.32 And this is as it should be, he argues, because loyalty can
arise only after a period of time (there is no such thing as “instant” loyalty),
and in the context of an affective relationship, whereas law sometimes imposes
ﬁduciary duties instantly and between strangers.33 Signiﬁcantly, all of these
theories of ﬁduciary law reject the idea that ﬁduciary legal norms address the
quality of a ﬁduciary’s deliberations.
Other theorists have critiqued Leib and Galoob’s account directly. Andrew
Gold, for example, claims that there is a tension between the Leib-Galoob view
that the beneﬁciary’s interests must matter to the ﬁduciary “solely because they
are the interests of the beneﬁciary” and the standard view of the duty to obey

29.

30.

31.
32.

33.
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(1991); Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1045-47 (1991); Robert H. Sitkoff, The
Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1039, 1045-46 (2011). In previous work,
Leib and Galoob have engaged with this literature directly. See Galoob & Leib, Intentions, supra note 8, at 125-29.
See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 28, at 29-30; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993); see also Jordan v. Duff &
Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) (characterizing the ﬁduciary
duty of loyalty as “a standby or off-the-rack guess about what parties would agree to if they
dickered about the subject explicitly”).
See, e.g., MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE PERFORMANCE OF
NON-FIDUCIARY DUTIES 4 (2010); J.E. Penner, Is Loyalty a Virtue, and Even if It Is, Does It Really Help Explain Fiduciary Liability?, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW
159, 166-68 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS].
See CONAGLEN, supra note 30, at 107-09.
Stephen A. Smith, The Deed, Not the Motive: Fiduciary Law Without Loyalty, in CONTRACT,
STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 53 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew Gold eds., forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript at 8) (on ﬁle with authors).
Id. (manuscript at 2-4).
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the law under which one has the duty to obey just because the law says so.34 As
Gold puts it, “[i]n following the law because the law says so, the loyal individual will be taking the beneﬁciary’s interests into account for the wrong reasons.”35 And Paul Miller objects, as do we, that Leib and Galoob “can fairly be
said to mistake a (rather demanding) moral conception of loyalty for the legal
conception.”36 The deliberative features that Leib and Galoob elaborate are
therefore not ones that “almost all” ﬁduciary theorists would recognize as positive criteria, let alone accept as prescriptive criteria, for identifying ﬁduciary
norms.
The fact that many ﬁduciary theorists do not accept the idea that ﬁduciary
law subjects ﬁduciaries to deliberative legal requirements does not necessarily
mean, of course, that Leib and Galoob are wrong. In previous work, we too
have argued that ﬁduciary law is concerned with the processes of ﬁduciary decision-making. We have defended this idea by showing how ﬁduciary rules and
remedies in the United States and Canada reﬂect the republican principle of
non-domination and the Kantian principle of non-instrumentalization.37 “Fiduciary relations possess the [legal] form that relations of non-domination
must assume whenever one party holds power over another,” we have explained, insofar “as they require the power-holder to act with due regard for
the best interests of the beneﬁciary, taking into account his views and opinions.”38 Accordingly, “to avoid domination, the law directs that a ﬁduciary must
be prepared to explain how her actions are reasonably calculated to promote
her beneﬁciaries’ welfare.”39 Moreover, the duty of care requires a ﬁduciary to
“exercise her . . . discretion through a deliberative process, which includes, at a
minimum, clarifying the nature of the problem or opportunity, discerning the
range of permissible actions, evaluating the pros and cons of each alternative,
and developing an objectively reasonable rationale for the action taken.”40 Fiduciary law therefore requires ﬁduciaries to act deliberatively, with due solicitude

34.

35.
36.

37.
38.
39.

40.

Andrew Gold, Accommodating Loyalty, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW, supra
note 32 (manuscript at 32) (quoting Galoob & Leib, Intentions, supra note 8, at 117 (emphasis
added by Gold)).
Id. (manuscript at 32).
Paul B. Miller, Dimensions of Fiduciary Loyalty, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW
(Andrew S. Gold & D. Gordon Smith eds., forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 18 n.43) (on
ﬁle with authors).
See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY, supra note 5, at 103-04.
Id. at 103.
Criddle, Fiduciary Administration, supra note 4, at 471; see also id. at 448 (arguing that a ﬁduciary’s duty of loyalty entails an obligation to “act deliberately (not reﬂexively) and deliberatively (not arbitrarily or unilaterally)”).
Id. at 471.
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to the terms and purposes of their mandate and the best interests of their beneﬁciaries.41
Although ﬁduciary law does impose deliberative requirements on ﬁduciaries, Leib and Galoob lose their way when they conclude that all ﬁduciary norms
entail freestanding deliberative requirements. Indeed, it is precisely this freestanding aspect that they take to be both distinctive and deﬁnitive of ﬁduciary
norms. Although criminal law too has a deliberative requirement—mens rea—
this requirement, Leib and Galoob say, is always tied to the behavior of the legal subject.42 Leib and Galoob claim that criminal law norms thus possess “a
manifestation requirement: mental states (e.g., how an agent deliberates, what
she intends, what she disregards) and their absence matter to criminal liability
only insofar as they are connected with an agent’s behavior.”43 Fiduciary norms,
on the other hand, are said to “reject the manifestation requirement” because
“[d]isloyalty or carelessness can constitute a violation of these norms, regardless of whether or how these mental states are revealed in behavior.”44 Ethically
robust and freestanding deliberative requirements thus ﬁgure as necessary and
structural features of ﬁduciary norms under Leib and Galoob’s “shaping account” of loyalty. These features, however, are simply not present in core doctrines of private ﬁduciary law.
Consider, for example, the duty of loyalty’s strict requirements that a ﬁduciary refrain from engaging in self-interested transactions without her beneﬁciary’s consent (the “no-conﬂict rule”) and the requirement that a ﬁduciary relinquish any unauthorized proﬁts to her beneﬁciary (the “no-proﬁt rule”).45
The no-conﬂict and no-proﬁt rules are core elements of ﬁduciary law, but entirely indifferent to the ﬁduciary’s motives or reasons for action. Even if a ﬁduciary could show that an exercise of power was deliberative, conscientious, and
robust in precisely the way that Leib and Galoob intend, she would still breach
her duty to the beneﬁciary were she to violate either rule. No amount of inter-

41.

See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY, supra note 5, at 20.
See Leib & Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory, supra note 7, at 1830 (“In judging whether
someone has lived up to a criminal norm, behavior is a threshold issue. An agent’s deliberation is relevant only insofar as her behavior does not conform to that prescribed by the
norm; deliberation is not relevant independently of behavior.”).
43. Id. at 1831.
44. Id. at 1832.
45. See Bray v. Ford [1896] AC 44, 51 (appeal taken from Eng.) (“It is an inﬂexible rule of a
Court of Equity that a person in a ﬁduciary position . . . is not, unless otherwise expressly
provided, entitled to make a proﬁt; he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his
interest and duty conﬂict.”).
42.
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nal good will can undo this external wrong;46 a ﬁduciary may breach the noconﬂict rule “with perfect good faith.”47 Accordingly, at least some ﬁduciary
norms do not entail freestanding deliberative requirements, or at least it is not
obvious that they do. Where unauthorized conﬂicts of interest are concerned,
ﬁduciary law appears to regulate a ﬁduciary’s behavior without inquiring into
the deliberativeness, conscientiousness, or robustness of the ﬁduciary’s decision-making process.
In prior work, Galoob and Leib acknowledge this disconnect, claiming that
“a ﬁduciary could meet the ‘no conﬂict’ and ‘no proﬁt’ rules without acting loyally,” since one can comply with these rules accidentally, or without otherwise
having the right mental state.48 As a “real-world example” they offer a hypothetical case of a hedge fund operation that relies on a software program to
make investment decisions. The managers could comply with the no-conﬂict
and no-proﬁt rules, they say, but “would seem to run afoul of their requirement of loyalty” and so their commissions “would seem to be susceptible to
disgorgement, the standard remedy for a breach of the legal duty of loyalty.”49
Galoob and Leib do not offer an actual case with facts like these, and to the best
of our knowledge none exists, though the use of software algorithms for high
frequency trading is a well-established practice. In our view, their “real-world
example” shows simply that their conception of loyalty does not track the conception that inheres in ﬁduciary law.
The fact that Galoob and Leib characterize the no-conﬂict and no-proﬁt
rules as “prophylactic” suggests that they appreciate that these rules do not actually entail freestanding legal requirements of deliberation, conscientiousness,
or robustness.50 Leib and Galoob could suggest that requirements of deliberation, conscientiousness, and robustness are implicit in these rules, because a ﬁduciary who violated these rules could never claim to have exercised her power
in a manner that was duly deliberative and conscientious.51 To the extent that
they believe such prophylactic rules are consistent with their theory of ﬁduciary

46.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Boardman v. Phipps [1966] 2 AC 46, 47 (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding ﬁduciaries liable
for using information obtained as a result of their ﬁduciary role to make a proﬁt on a stock
transaction); Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134, 137 (appeal taken from
Eng.) (holding ﬁduciaries liable for using knowledge they obtained through their official
duties to make a proﬁt and noting that “their liability . . . does not depend upon proof of
mala ﬁdes”).
Bray, [1896] AC at 48.
Galoob & Leib, Intentions, supra note 8, at 130.
Id.
Leib & Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory, supra note 7, at 1834.
See id. (arguing that the “prophylactic” character of the no-conﬂict rule “coheres
with . . . structural features of ﬁduciary norms”).
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norms without inviting case-by-case consideration of a ﬁduciary’s internal deliberative process, however, it is curious that they do not entertain the possibility that legal requirements governing behavior in other contexts might serve a
similar function.
A more basic ﬂaw in the framework Leib and Galoob propose for identifying ﬁduciary norms is their reiterated assertion that ﬁduciary norms impose
constraints on a ﬁduciary’s motivations. Speciﬁcally, their proposed norm of
“conscientiousness” requires that ﬁduciaries not act for “the wrong kinds of
reasons,”52 and in their discussion of several cases they make it clear that acting
for “the wrong kinds of reasons” means being motivated to act by the wrong
reasons.53 In their discussion of an administrative law case, for example, they
claim that the U.S. Supreme Court invokes “the wrong kinds of reasons”
framework, and they interpret its judgment to affirm that “the reasons that motivated the EPA to promulgate the regulation diverged from the reasons that
justiﬁed (or could have justiﬁed) its action, and this divergence ultimately
compromised the legitimacy of the action.”54 In their examination of international law and human rights, they discuss a state “whose motivations are inappropriate.”55 These statements are consistent with a previous collaboration in
which they more fully articulate their “shaping” account of loyalty, explicitly
stating that their account “allows for the possibility that someone’s motives
could bear on whether she acts loyally.”56
In their essay in this Journal, Leib and Galoob present a hypothetical ﬁduciary whose loyal behavior is motivated by the fact that her beneﬁciary is a member of the same religion, rather than by the beneﬁciary’s status as a beneﬁciary
tout court. In their view, it is not enough that the co-religionist ﬁduciary “think
about and act in a way that happens to advance the beneﬁciary’s interests or
ends” and publicly justify her actions in terms that are consistent with ﬁdelity
to her beneﬁciary’s interests.57 Instead, they argue that to satisfy the principle
of conscientiousness, the reasons that motivate the co-religionist ﬁduciary’s ac-

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

57.
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Id. at 1837.
Id. at 1835-38.
Id. at 1863 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1874 (emphasis added).
Galoob & Leib, Intentions, supra note 8, at 124 n.61. In a forthcoming piece, they claim once
again that the principle of conscientiousness is concerned with “monitor[ing] whether motivating reasons diverge from justifying reasons.” Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, The
Core of Fiduciary Political Theory, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW (D. Gordon
Smith & Andrew S. Gold eds., forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 11) (on ﬁle with authors).
Leib & Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory, supra note 7, at 1838.
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tions must reﬂect her single-minded “commitment to the fate of the purpose or
person” entrusted to her care.58
Contrary to the assertions of Leib and Galoob, however, a ﬁduciary’s motivations for action are irrelevant as a matter of positive law.59 As long as a ﬁduciary performs her entrusted duties with due regard for her principal’s instructions and her beneﬁciaries’ best interests, the law does not care whether the
reasons motivating her actions are based on co-religionist solidarity, fear of legal sanction, or a desire to secure her future place in heaven. As long as the coreligionist ﬁduciary does not assert the prerogative to wield entrusted power in
a manner that is indifferent to her beneﬁciaries’ interests, she does not subject
her beneﬁciary to instrumentalization or domination, and she does not violate
any norm of ﬁduciary law.60 Indeed, as we will discuss in Part III, a signiﬁcant
hurdle faced by the Leib/Galoob approach is that legal ﬁduciaries are always
subject to the law’s external threat of coercion. If genuine ﬁduciary loyalty, as
Leib and Galoob understand it, must always arise from within so as to satisfy a
“standard of compliance” alleged to govern a mental state, how can it ever be
the proper object of law’s coercive force?
In sum, the theory of ﬁduciary norms that Leib and Galoob propose would
require signiﬁcant revision to serve as a plausible explanatory “framework for
analyzing the usefulness and limitations of ﬁduciary political theory.”61 To be
sure, ﬁduciaries are legally required to exercise their discretionary powers in a
deliberative manner, manifesting solicitude toward their principals’ instructions and their beneﬁciaries’ best interests. In many contexts, the ﬁduciary duty
of loyalty is also “robustly demanding” in the sense that a ﬁduciary must take
into account how changing circumstances would impact her beneﬁciaries’ best
58.

Id. at 1836 (quoting Miller, supra note 20, at 23-24); see also id. at 1874 (arguing that human
rights are not ﬁduciary norms because they do not require that a state’s “motivation for protecting the human rights of its population is . . . connected to the justiﬁcation for human
rights”).
59. See Bray v Ford [1896] AC 48 (appeal taken from Eng.) (explaining that a ﬁduciary may violate the no-conﬂict rule in “good faith”); Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Ex
Post: The Non-Contractual Basis of Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW 208, 220 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (“Legal obligations—
both contractual and ﬁduciary—turn on intentions not motivations.”).
60. Leib and Galoob cite two cases in which the Delaware Supreme Court held that a ﬁduciary
violates her duties if she “intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the
best interests of [her beneﬁciary].” Leib & Galoob, supra note 7, at 1836 n.65 (quoting Stone
v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27,
67 (Del. 2006)). In neither of these cases, however, did the court suggest that it would be
appropriate to question a ﬁduciary’s motivations. The relevant question, instead, was simply
whether the ﬁduciary acted on the good faith belief that her actions would advance her beneﬁciary’s best interests.
61. Leib & Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory, supra note 7, at 1823.
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interests.62 Nonetheless, it does not follow, as Leib and Galoob appear to conclude in their essay, that just because some ﬁduciaries are subject to some deliberative obligations under ﬁduciary law, then all ﬁduciary norms necessarily
entail or possess freestanding deliberative requirements. As we have seen, the
categorical no-conﬂict and no-proﬁt rules appear to neither entail nor possess
any such requirements, as Leib and Galoob seem to recognize. Moreover, purely as a matter of interpretive theory, there is no good reason to accept Leib and
Galoob’s suggestion that a legal regime must embrace their structural features
of deliberation, conscientiousness, and robustness to qualify as “ﬁduciary.”63
Nor is there merit to their argument that ﬁduciary norms require “that the reasons motivating a state’s action are congruent with the reasons that legally justify its action.”64 Under well-established private law, a ﬁduciary’s motivations
are irrelevant. Accordingly, even when ﬁduciary norms call for scrutiny of a ﬁduciary’s deliberative process, this scrutiny focuses on whether a ﬁduciary has
discharged her mandate carefully and in good faith, not whether her actions
were ethically compromised by her reliance on the “wrong” motivating reasons.
ii. applying fiduciary theory to international law
As noted, Leib and Galoob categorically reject the idea that existing international law is amenable to ﬁduciary theorizing because, in their view, “ﬁduciary
norms are structurally incompatible with the extant norms of international
law.”65 In this Part we discuss why their critique is misconceived.
In our book, Fiduciaries of Humanity: How International Law Constitutes Authority, we discuss a variety of contexts in which international law itself explicitly draws on ﬁduciary or trusteeship norms.66 These include cases of international territorial administration, such as occurred in East Timor and Kosovo,
and cases of belligerent occupation, where the belligerent occupier is viewed as

62.

63.

64.
65.
66.
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Id. at 1839. This is plainly not the case, however, for some ﬁduciary relationships, such as
charitable and testamentary trusts, which task a ﬁduciary with carrying out a discrete mandate without regard to her beneﬁciaries’ idiosyncratic interests and ends.
For example, no one questions the fact that Australia has a well-developed body of ﬁduciary
law, but Australian courts have ﬁrmly rejected the idea that ﬁduciary duties entail prescriptive requirements of deliberation, solicitude, or robustness. See Pilmer v Duke Grp. Ltd.
(2001) 207 CLR 165, 198; Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 113.
Leib & Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory, supra note 7, at 1874.
Id. at 1870.
CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY, supra note 5. It should be noted the
Leib and Galoob had only an incomplete draft manuscript of the book when they wrote their
essay, and that most of their essay draws on an earlier article, Evan Fox-Decent & Evan J.
Criddle, The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights, 15 LEGAL THEORY 301 (2009).
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a trustee of the occupied people.67 There is also a lively debate in international
relations scholarship over whether international courts are best viewed as
agents of the states that create them or trustees of the law that they administer.68 Both sides of the controversy agree, however, that international judges are
ﬁduciaries, because both agents and trustees are ﬁduciaries. Leib and Galoob
do not address this debate, nor do they consider cases such as territorial administration and belligerent occupation where international law expressly deploys
ﬁduciary norms.
Indeed, Leib and Galoob do not refer to a single judicial institution or judicial decision of international law. While their critique focuses on a single human right of international law—the right to be free from torture—they generalize from this critique that “[t]he ﬁduciary theory of international law thus does
not provide an accurate picture of human rights law, or international law more
generally.”69 As our book observes, international legal order now has some
twenty-four permanent and functioning international courts that have handed
down over 37,000 legal judgments.70 Like domestic judges, international judges apply law to the facts and parties before them. Leib and Galoob’s failure to
make any mention of international adjudication is an extraordinary omission,
since their essay lionizes judging as the public law context par excellence to
which ﬁduciary norms unqualiﬁedly apply. Having neglected international
courts, Leib and Galoob offer no reason to think that international judging is
any less susceptible to ﬁduciary theorizing than domestic judging.
Nor do Leib and Galoob engage with our discussion of global administrative law.71 As its name suggests, global administrative law takes its cues from
domestic administrative law, including the idea that persons subject to public
authority ought to enjoy various participatory rights and be given reasons for
decisions adverse to their interests. While global administrative law advances a
normative point, legal scholars have shown that the practices of transnational
entities support the insight that law in this domain does, in fact, aspire to a cul-

67.

68.
69.
70.

71.

CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY, supra note 5, at 300-10; see also RALPH
WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION: HOW TRUSTEESHIP AND THE CIVILIZING MISSION NEVER WENT AWAY (2008) (exploring how international territorial administration continues to reﬂect trusteeship principles).
CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY, supra note 5, at 298-99.
Leib & Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory, supra note 7, at 1876 (emphasis added).
See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY, supra note 5, at 296-300 (citing
KAREN ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS
(2014)).
Id. at 331-36 (discussing the interface of global administrative law and ﬁduciary theory).
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ture of justiﬁcation in much the same way as domestic administrative law.72 If
Leib and Galoob accept that a culture-of-justiﬁcation view of administrative
law is consistent with ﬁduciary norms in the domestic context, they ought to
take the same view of global administrative law.
Having neglected the topics sketched above, Leib and Galoob focus their
ﬁre on international human rights law (IHRL). However, the target, as they
present it, is a crude caricature of IHRL. They claim this body of law is indifferent to deliberative processes and concerned (almost) solely with outcomes.73 This is certainly not how we understand IHRL, nor is it understood
this way by leading human rights theorists such as Allen Buchanan,74 Rainer
Forst,75 and Amartya Sen.76 Building on the contributions of these scholars,
our book characterizes and develops “a deliberative conception” of human
rights that is rooted in well-established IHRL norms and institutions.77 We
suggest that a “state that facilitates inclusive public deliberation over human
rights, soliciting public input and providing reasoned justiﬁcations for laws
and policies, demonstrates an appropriate solicitude for the legitimate interests
of citizens and noncitizens,”78 while “a state that does not support or engage in
public deliberation . . . fails to take seriously the dignity of legal subjects.”79
These deliberative features of IHRL are not merely the wishful thinking of
legal theorists, as Leib and Galoob suggest.80 Our book demonstrates that
IHRL itself expressly requires transparent and public justiﬁcation in the over-

72.
73.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
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See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17-23 (2005).
Leib & Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory, supra note 7, at 1825 (“[C]ompliance with international-law norms is a function of how states behave, rather than how they deliberate or why
they behave as they do.”); id. at 1871 (asserting that human rights “govern state behavior”
but “do not, in general, impose freestanding requirements regarding how a state must deliberate”). They claim that international human rights law is plainly inconsistent with deliberativeness and conscientiousness, and ultimately inconsistent with robustness because any deliberation in this regard is always tied to an outcome.
See Allen Buchanan, Human Rights and the Legitimacy of the International Order, 14 LEGAL
THEORY 39, 40-41 (2008).
See RAINER FORST, THE RIGHT TO JUSTIFICATION: ELEMENTS OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY
OF JUSTICE (2011).
See Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315 (2004).
CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY, supra note 5, at 105-06.
Id. at 105.
Id.
See Leib & Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory, supra note 7, at 1877 (“Perhaps the world
would be a better place if [a] rigorous culture of justiﬁcation applied to the international legal realm. But that is not the world we live in . . . .”).
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whelming majority of cases involving international human rights.81 In most
contexts, human rights treaties permit a state party to restrict, limit, or derogate from human rights norms, but only if the state provides an adequate justiﬁcation based on public-regarding considerations tied to a principle of proportionality.82 The general structure of an inquiry into a violation of an
international human right is a two-stage process. The ﬁrst stage is to determine
whether state action infringes the right. The second stage asks after whether
the infringement is justiﬁed as a proportionate means to a public end, with the
burden on the state to show that it has taken appropriate measures to minimize
the effect of the infringement.83 This structure, in other words, calls on states
to justify publicly that they have acted with deliberativeness and robustness,
taking due and conscientious regard of the interests of those adversely affected.
Furthermore, when international courts review state action, they generally
do not concern themselves with whether the state produced the correct or even
legally best outcome. Instead, courts review whether the state’s justiﬁcation of
its action discloses a reasonable and proportionate use of state authority, taking
into account both the public interest and the interests of those directly affected.
States are allowed a “margin of appreciation” in which the focus is not a speciﬁc
outcome, but rather the justiﬁcation offered for the state’s chosen policy.84 If
the justiﬁcation relies on improper purposes or irrelevant considerations, then
the decision on which it is based will be set aside, just as the decision would be
set aside under ordinary principles of administrative law in the United States
and commonwealth jurisdictions.85 Leib and Galoob ignore the state’s obligation to render an account publicly, which is a general feature of IHRL.

81.

82.

83.
84.

85.

We discuss these requirements in considerable detail in chapters devoted to human rights,
emergencies, and international institutions. See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF
HUMANITY, supra note 5, chs. 3, 4 & 8.
See, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 52, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1
(permitting states to limit human rights only “[s]ubject to the principle of proportionality”
and as “necessary [to] genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union
or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others”); Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 56 (1961) (holding that states must provide reasoned public justiﬁcations
for derogating from human rights norms). Under international law, rights to freedom of
expression, movement, and assembly, for example, may all be limited in times of crisis or
when the public interest so warrants. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY, supra note 5, at 132.
See Murray v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14310/88, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 193, ¶ 90 (1994) (“A
certain margin of appreciation in deciding what measures to take both in general and in particular cases should be left to the national authorities.”).
See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY, supra note 5, at 151-52.
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As noted in Part I, there is a narrow body of international norms—
peremptory norms—that do not conform to the two-stage structure described
above, since they do not admit of restriction, limitation, or derogation. The
prohibitions against arbitrary killing, genocide, apartheid, and torture belong
to this category.86 In our view, these norms of international law are roughly
akin to the strict proscriptive norms of private ﬁduciary law, such as the noconﬂict and no-proﬁt rules. As with the no-conﬂict and no-proﬁt rules, it is not
necessary to scrutinize a state’s deliberative process on a case-by-case basis
when peremptory norms are at stake. By deﬁnition, arbitrary killing, genocide,
apartheid, and torture entail intentional or reckless disregard for human rights,
such that no state that violated the norms proscribing these actions could claim
to have acted with due regard for its victims.87
Leib and Galoob base their argument against ﬁduciary theorizing of international law on a hypothetical scenario in which State A declines to extradite
people to State B to curry favor with State C. Unbeknownst to State A, State B
tortures those in its custody. Leib and Galoob assert that “State A’s policy has
the effect of protecting the human rights of those within its territory.”88 State A
would comply with international law, on their view, but it would breach ﬁduciary norms because the decision not to deport would be taken for the wrong
reasons. This, they infer, shows that IHRL generally does not impose delibera-

86.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. k, § 702
cmts. d-i, (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
87. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. II,
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (deﬁning genocide to require an “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such” (emphasis
added)); ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 6.1 (“No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”
(emphasis added)). Elsewhere, one of us has argued that violations of the no-conﬂict and
no-proﬁt rules are likewise never consistent with ﬁduciary loyalty. See Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 95 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
However, even if one views the no-conﬂict and no-proﬁt rules as over-inclusive prophylactic
rules, see Leib & Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory, supra note 7, at 1834 (endorsing this
view), the parallels between these rules and peremptory human rights norms are compelling.
88. Leib & Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory, supra note 7, at 1870. It is misleading, under international human rights law, to suggest that State A’s non-deportation policy “protected” the
human rights of those within its territory. In the standard case, to protect human rights
means to take deliberate action to prevent third parties from interfering with them. One
could concoct a fanciful scenario under which building roads might incidentally have the
effect of preventing human rights abuses, but it would not count as protecting human rights
in the way “protection of human rights” is understood under international law.
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tive requirements on states, since on their view states can comply with international law for any reason without breaching its norms.89
In fact, State A’s refusal to deport people to curry favor with State C is
simply irrelevant to its human rights obligations. Its obligation under the Convention Against Torture is to refuse to send “a person to another State where
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.”90 Having, by hypothesis, no grounds to believe that deportation would lead to torture, State A is not under an obligation to refuse extraditing people to State B, and would not violate its obligations under the
Convention if it did. It is only if State A knowingly deported someone to face a
serious risk of torture in State B that State A would violate its international obligation not to so deport. As we discuss momentarily, State A would breach its
extant international obligation whether or not the deportee is actually tortured in
State B. This implies that, contra Leib and Galoob, outcomes in this context are
in principle irrelevant to the determination of liability for breach of the international norm against deportation to torture.91 An adverse outcome following
deportation may help a complainant meet her evidentiary burden against the
deporting state, but it is not a necessary element of that state’s liability.
In practice, courts adjudicating cases where it is possible that deportation
will lead to torture pay great attention to the deliberative process of the state
party. In Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration),92 for example, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a request for relief from deportation
from an individual who claimed he would face a serious risk of torture if returned to his home state. The Court held that the government violated the petitioner’s rights under domestic and international law by failing to adequately
disclose its case to the individual so that he might respond in a timely manner.93 Similarly, in Agiza v. Sweden,94 the U.N. Committee Against Torture
affirmed that a state’s deliberative process is so important in cases under the

89.

90.
91.

92.
93.

94.

Id. at 1870 (concluding for this reason that international law is “structurally incompatible”
with ﬁduciary theory). See generally id. at 1868-76 (rejecting ﬁduciary theory as inapposite to
the realities of international law).
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114; S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988).
See Leib & Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory, supra note 7, at 1872 (arguing that “the most
central goods secured by international law”—including freedom from torture—”seem capable of being achieved solely through the realization of outcomes”).
[2002] SCR 3 (Can.).
Id. ¶¶ 122-30. The Court took account of international law explicitly, id. at ¶¶ 59-75, 119,
when it turned to imposing procedural guarantees that were not explicit in either the statute
or the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Agiza v. Sweden, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005).
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Convention Against Torture that a state may violate its substantive obligations
under the Convention, even if the individual deported is never subjected to torture.95 The Committee held that, in the deportation context, the prohibition
against torture is concerned with a state’s reckless disregard for a serious threat,
not the actual inﬂiction of torture per se. To use the terminology of Leib and
Galoob, what matters is the quality of the deporting state’s deliberative process—its conscientious regard for the interests of those who may be affected by
its actions—rather than the ultimate outcome for the individual. Thus, both
Suresh and Agiza affirm that IHRL regulates the deliberative process by which a
state makes deportation decisions, not merely the mistreatment that individuals actually suffer upon deportation.
To sum up, there is little merit to Leib and Galoob’s argument that international law cannot accommodate ﬁduciary theorizing. International law has
drawn expressly on ﬁduciary principles and norms since its inception,96 and
these principles and norms remain deeply embedded in international legal institutions today. Public ﬁduciary theory is committed to a form of deliberative
decision-making that reﬂects due regard for the dynamic interests of all those
who are subject to state power, and this commitment is the very lodestar of
IHRL. Properly understood, therefore, there can be little question that international human rights and many other international legal norms are good candidates for explanation and justiﬁcation under ﬁduciary theory.
iii. methodology in public fiduciary theory
Another way in which Leib and Galoob misconstrue our theory relates to
our methodology. They claim that for us “the case for a ﬁduciary theory of international law arises out of the conjunction of two abstract principles of political morality”—namely, the republican principle of non-domination, which eschews arbitrary power, and the Kantian principle of non-instumentalization,
which eschews treating persons as mere means of others.97 In fact, our methodology is one of inference to the best explanation; the principles of non-

95.

Id. ¶¶ 13.1-13.5. Even the lone dissenting opinion in the case concurred that “the time of removal” was the “key point” for consideration, such that evidence that “relates to events transpiring after expulsion” (i.e., alleged torture) “can have little relevance.” Id. ¶ 1 (Separate
Opinion of Committee Member Mr. Alexander Yakovlev).
96. See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY, supra note 5, at 15-17; Evan J. Criddle, A Sacred Trust of Civilization: Fiduciary Foundations of International Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 30, at 404.
97. Leib & Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory, supra note 7, at 1869; see also id. at 1876 (suggesting incorrectly that our theory seeks to “straightforwardly derive the fundamentals of international law from the principles of nondomination and noninstrumentalization”).
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domination and non-instrumentalization emerge from the core features of international law and legal institutions, and only once inferred provisionally do
they supply a basis for downstream critique.98
Leib and Galoob’s methodology, we contend in this Part, is to proceed on
the basis of abstract moral philosophizing within a virtue ethics framework attuned to the demands of close personal relations, such as friendship. The challenge this framework faces is that it is both more demanding than law actually
is and more demanding than, arguably, it is possible for law to be. There are, in
other words, empirical and conceptual tensions between Leib and Galoob’s virtue ethics theory of ﬁduciary norms and the legal domains it purports to explain. In this Part we explore some of these tensions.
Virtue ethicists challenge agent-neutral moral theories on the grounds that
these impersonal theories cannot account for the special commitments and dispositions of friendship.99 In relation to utilitarianism, for example, the problem
can be put this way: how can utilitarians account for the special moral attachment and loyalty we have for our friends when, in the utilitarian calculus, our
friends are not to have any greater moral signiﬁcance for us than the moral signiﬁcance we attribute to strangers?100 Leib and Galoob adopt a substantive
view and methodological approach that closely resembles the virtue ethics assault on generalist moral theories.101
98.

See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY, supra note 5, at 4 (drawing upon
the concept of “reﬂective equilibrium” in JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20 (1971)).
99. See, e.g., J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973) (arguing that utilitarianism is too demanding, giving short shrift to moral goods that matter);
Neera Badhwar Kapur, Why It Is Wrong To Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism
and Friendship, 101 ETHICS 483, 488 (1991) (arguing for “a ‘commonsense’ morality that justiﬁes friendship”); Michael Stocker, The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories, 73 J. PHIL.
453 (1976) (arguing that friends must act from particularist motives rather than general
moral duty).
100. See, e.g., Peter Railton, Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 93 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988) (discussing the implications
of alienation on consequentialist moral theories). Indirect consequentialism holds that one
can, and should, develop special attachments and relations because, as an empirical matter, it
is only by doing so that one can reasonably expect to do the best. The consequentialist good
is thus achieved indirectly, in part, through the cultivation of friendships.
101. Indeed, in a recent collaboration, they begin the defense of their “shaping” account of loyalty
with one of Bernard Williams’s famous arguments against utilitarianism:
After a shipwreck, a number of people are drowning, including an agent’s spouse.
Various impartial moral schemes might justify the husband’s saving his wife rather than a stranger . . . . Yet it is difficult to say that the husband has acted loyally . . . . The husband would have, in Williams’s memorable phrase, “one thought
too many,” since “it might have been hoped by someone (for instance, by his wife)
that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be the thought that it was
his wife, not that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is permissible
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Leib and Galoob make no serious attempt, however, to use their theory to
explain ﬁduciary law as ﬁduciary law presents itself, citing just ﬁve judicial decisions in their discussion of the structure of ﬁduciary norms.102 They identify
deliberative norms of virtue ethics that are very much at home in relations of
friendship, but which they errantly believe are necessarily present across all private law ﬁduciary relations. And they compound their error by then holding
public law regimes to that standard. For the reasons Smith gives,103 we do not
think that dispositional norms of friendship are especially helpful to the task of
understanding private relations governed by private law. It follows that we do
not think that public law regimes need to meet this standard to count as ﬁduciary in nature.
Roughly, we are hewing to the distinction between law and ethics made
famous by Kant more than two hundred years ago.104 Kant held that the domain of right or law concerns itself solely with external and reciprocal limits to
which all are subject so that “the freedom of choice of each can coexist with
everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law.”105 The sphere of ethics
or virtue, on the other hand, cannot be subject to coercion because the will is
free and internal to the agent. Law governs our external relations with others,
whereas ethics governs our internal relation to self-legislated maxims that
make virtue possible. What is distinctive of ethics, for Kant, is that “one is to
perform [ethical] actions just because they are duties and to make the principle
of duty itself . . . the sufficient incentive for choice.”106 Thus, while others can
enlist the state to force one to act in accordance with the principles of right,
others cannot force one to act ethically, because the only possible ground of

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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to save one’s wife.” Likewise, on the shaping account, loyalty requires not only
that the beneﬁciary’s interests matter, but also that these interests matter because
of their connection with the beneﬁciary and not in virtue of some other consideration.
Galoob & Leib, Intentions, supra note 8, at 116 (quoting and citing BERNARD WILLIAMS,
MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980 18 (1981)). This is the foundational article
for their “shaping” account, the content of which is drawn much more from the insights of
moral philosophers—Bernard Gert, Simon Keller, David Owens, Philip Pettit, T.M. Scanlon,
Michael Stocker, and Bernard Williams—than judicial decisions or other legal materials.
There is, of course, nothing per se objectionable to any of this, but it does help explain their
apparent preference for hypothetical examples over actual cases, as well as the virtue ethics
quality of their theory.
See supra Part I.
Smith, supra note 32, at 2-12.
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 42, 45-47 (Mary Gregor transl., 1991)
(1797).
Id. at 56 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 47.

keeping the promise of public fiduciary theory

ethical action is internal to the agent. Kant’s law/ethics distinction tracks and
explains other familiar distinctions, such as the distinction between the ethical
duty of beneﬁcence, which is owed to no one in particular, and the legal duty to
perform a contract, which is owed to only the other contracting party who has
an enforceable right to performance. Notably, Leib and Galoob explicitly affirm
that their “shaping” account of loyalty “is inconsistent with the Kantian
framework [of right and virtue] because it sees loyalty as a duty of right (in
that loyalty is both directed and legally enforceable) yet allows for the possibility that someone’s motives could bear directly on whether she acts loyally.”107
While acting for wrong or wicked reasons can still be the subject of legal
inquiry, as in the case of the mens rea inquiry of criminal law, the wrongful intention must somehow be connected to a wrong against another person, such
as an illicit act or decision that leaves another with less than her due. The idea
that private law governs thoughts and intentions independently of some connection to a wrong implies the existence of a category of “thought-wrongs”
that does not exist in private law. The notion that a legal ﬁduciary could breach
her duty to the beneﬁciary by failing to have the right internal motivation,
while nonetheless acting in a manner consistent with her mandate and the ordinary duties of her office, is to extend the norms of virtue into the legal realm
where they have no place. Virtue cannot be coerced.108
There are contexts, of course, in which the kinds of internal commitments
and dispositions to which Leib and Galoob refer are particularly important:
close personal relationships such as friendship. It makes perfect sense to think
that one cannot act as a true friend or loyal spouse except for the right reasons,
and with special care and concern. Leib has previously written a thoughtprovoking piece suggesting that “friends should be more routinely considered
as ﬁduciaries for each other,” by which he means that friends should more routinely be viewed as legal ﬁduciaries subject to legal obligations.109 Whatever the
merits of subjecting friends to legal ﬁduciary standards, it is quite another mat-

107.

Galoob & Leib, Intentions, supra note 8, at 124 n.61.
The intractable difficulty of attempts to coerce virtue is visible in another context. In cases
where parties seek redress for historical wrongs, they often seek an apology. On most construals, however, apologies must come from within, and must be based on the wrongdoer
freely owning up to the wrong inﬂicted. There is a sense in which a court-ordered apology
would corrupt the practice and deny both the wrongdoer and the victim the possibility of
the fullest possible moral reconciliation. This is not to deny the expressive value of a courtordered apology, but it is an expressive value that, when judged from a moral perspective, is
arguably second-best. Such would be the fate of judicial attempts to coerce the kind of loyalty that helps make friendship meaningful.
109. Leib & Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory, supra note 7, at 1839, n.76 (citing Leib, supra note
8, at 686, as “developing an account of friendship by exploring ﬁduciary concepts—and viceversa” (emphasis added)).
108.
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ter to suppose, as Leib and Galoob seem to do, that the norms of friendship
apply structurally and invariably to all ﬁduciary relations known to law. While
the norms of virtue ethics are appropriate to friendship, they are ill-suited to
inform legal theory because legal obligations are coercively enforceable whereas, generally speaking, having or not having the right reasons for action is not
something that can be coerced.
In our view, courts can coerce a kind of loyalty and solicitude, but it is not
the interpersonal loyalty typical of friendship. Instead, in the legal ﬁduciary
context, it is the loyalty or commitment one expects of a person who assumes
an office, private or public, and its responsibilities. It does not matter whether
the office-holder acts with the purest of motives so long as she acts in a manner
consistent with the charge she has undertaken, and with due regard for those
subject to her discretion. In the domestic and international public law spheres,
the office-holder does so in part by disclosing transparently the reasons for her
decision, and allowing those reasons to be tested by independent review. In
this public and external sense, ﬁduciary decision-makers are subject to freestanding deliberative requirements.
For public law regimes to count as ﬁduciary, they need to exhibit the constitutive structural features of private law ﬁduciary relations. In our book and
in other writings, we have made the case that all of the regimes discussed by
Leib and Galoob have these structural features, making allowance of course for
the distinctive standing of public authorities. The fruitful challenge the theorist
then faces is determining the content of the obligations that can be said to follow from the nature of the various public ﬁduciary relations in which public
authorities ﬁnd themselves vis-à-vis the people over whom they hold authority.
conclusion
Leib and Galoob have done a great service by drawing attention to the
astonishing range of public settings to which theorists have brought ﬁduciary
principles to bear. They are also to be credited for advancing our understanding
of the deliberative requirements of loyalty and care in the domain of ethics—in
particular, where loving relations and friendship are in play. Their theory of ﬁduciary norms, however, is plainly inconsistent with core features of ﬁduciary
law in the private law setting, including the law’s thoroughgoing aversion to
coercing virtue. Were their theory true, no substantive body of law—not just
administrative law and international law—would ever count as unqualiﬁedly
ﬁduciary, including the most focal cases of private law, such as those involving
trustees, agents, and corporate directors. Their attack on public ﬁduciary theory, then, is really an attack on all theorizing that seeks to explain the law of ﬁduciaries as it presents itself.
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When Leib and Galoob train their sights on international law speciﬁcally,
their critique proves unpersuasive. They neglect those parts of international
law we discuss that explicitly adopt a ﬁduciary framework. They neglect international judicial institutions, notwithstanding having concluded earlier in their
essay that judging is unqualiﬁedly apt for ﬁduciary theorizing. They neglect
global administrative law, notwithstanding having conceded the viability in
principle of a ﬁduciary understanding of domestic administrative law. And they
neglect the most fundamental and widespread structure of judicial review under IHRL, a global paradigm for rights review, which itself contains an expressly deliberative aspect. Instead, they base their critique on a hypothetical
torture case, but they miss that in this context, too, international law imposes
freestanding—but public—deliberative requirements. Thus, in their eagerness
to impose on law a virtue ethics framework derived from abstract moral philosophy, Leib and Galoob lose sight of law itself.
We believe that the future of public ﬁduciary theory lies elsewhere. Rather
than look to virtue ethics as a guide for public law, ﬁduciary theorists would be
wise to adopt Rawls’s methodology of reﬂective equilibrium, distilling the
normative structure of public ﬁduciary relationships from examination of wellestablished legal norms and institutions. This is the approach we have taken in
our previous writings on public ﬁduciary theory, and we are conﬁdent that it
will be the dominant methodology among ﬁduciary law scholars for years to
come. Proceeding with this method, public ﬁduciary theory will be best positioned to realize its promise.
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